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THE NEED FOR A LENIENT ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD FOR
DEFENSE FORENSIC EVIDENCE
Myeonki Kim*

I. INTRODUCTION

The reliability of forensic evidence is crucial to the search for
truth.1 However, when DNA evidence began to reveal wrongful
convictions in the 1990s, doubts about the reliability of forensic
evidence increased.2 The influential report, Strengthening Forensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward,3 published by the
National Research Council (“NRC”) in 2009 (“2009 NRC Report”),
confirmed most of these suspicions.4 The report declared that many
forensic disciplines lack a sufficient scientific basis and that courts
had failed to filter out problematic forensic evidence.5
The impacts were huge. Forensic practitioners, lawyers, and
academics have taken seriously the lessons of the 2009 NRC Report.
However, there is an imbalance in the efforts for change. 6 Since
2009, demands for reform in forensic disciplines have significantly
increased, and governmental support for reforms followed.7 In
contrast, the courts remain reluctant to strictly review the reliability
of forensic evidence.8 Although the authority of the report is widely
acknowledged, it has not governed the admissibility of individual
pieces of evidence. Simply put, courts have failed to rigorously
monitor the quality of forensic evidence, at least when that evidence
is proffered by the prosecution.
The problem is that forensic practices cannot be improved
* Senior Inspector, Korean National Police Agency. S.J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School, 2017.
I would like to thank Professor Keith A. Findley, Carrie Sperling, and Steven Wright for their helpful
comments this Article. All errors are mine alone.
1. This is because expert testimony generally addresses areas beyond juror’s knowledge and
therefore is very influential to lay person. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a) (An expert witness may testify if his
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” (emphasis added). With the emergence of modern science, the
number of cases requiring expert witnesses surged. Therefore, providing reliable and qualified expert
testimony is the core of today’s trial.
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCES COMMUNITY, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter 2009 NRC REPORT].
4. See infra note 34–43 & accompanying text.
5. See id.
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See infra note 77–86 & accompanying text.
8. See infra note 87–89 & accompanying text.
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independently from court policy.9 Another important report that was
recently published by the President's Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (“2016 PCAST Report”) indicated that after 2009,
only a few empirical studies had been conducted to measure the
accuracy of forensic method.10 Therefore, if the courts are not strict
in excluding unreliable forensic evidence, practices will remain the
same, with little incentive to change.11 Although the courts have
made some efforts to strengthen defendant’s constitutional rights,
they have not been enough.12
This article argues that, given this landscape, a new approach to
admissibility of forensic evidence is required to level the playing
field and create incentives for improving the reliability of forensic
evidence.13 Perhaps counter-intuitively, this article argues that the
most effective way to respond to the deficiencies in the forensic
sciences and the lax admissibility of forensic science evidence is to
lower the admissibility standard of forensic evidence (under the
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc. standard) for defendants,
on the condition that the evidence they are proffering is related to the
prosecution’s evidence.14 It analyzes the impact of the 2009 NRC
Report and the court’s on-going reluctance to exclude government
forensic evidence, and explains why an asymmetric standard is
necessary.15 If it is difficult for courts to strictly apply the Daubert
standard to the prosecution, then it is fair to also apply a lenient
standard to the defense. It would allow defendants to present their
own stories and to rebut prosecution experts more effectively. Given
the limited impact of the 2009 NRC Report and the limitations of
internal reform, perhaps the only way to rigorously test the reliability
of forensic evidence is to allow extensive attacks on the evidence in
the courtrooms. This change will also help realize the proposals in
2016 PCAST report.16
It might be argued that a lowered standard would cause (1) the
introduction of junk science; and (2) juror confusion and inconsistent
verdicts. These are reasonable concerns. Therefore, this article
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL
COURTS ENSURING VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS at 7–14 (Sept. 2016) [hereinafter
2016 PCAST REPORT], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp /PCAST/pcast
forensic science report final.pdf.
11. See infra note 111–12 & accompanying text.
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. Id.
15. See infra note 92–107 & accompanying text.
16. 2016 PCAST REPORT, supra note 10, at 14–20.
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presents specific examples and cases in which it is appropriate to
lower the standard for admissibility.17 This article also contends that
concerns about juror confusion and inconsistent results are
exaggerated.18
There are legal grounds for granting defendants a more lenient
standard than the prosecution: the defendant enjoys constitutionally
guaranteed rights to present favorable evidence.19 In addition, this
article’s proposal will contribute to weighing the expert testimony in
the court, in a more scientific way. Science—at least science used in
the courtroom—could be developed and strengthened through
adversarial testing.20 Thus, the prosecution’s forensic evidence is
expected to be made stronger and more reliable by confronting
conflicting evidence.21
Part II analyzes the recent discussions about forensic science,
focusing on increased doubts following the 2009 NRC Report and
recent efforts for reform. Part III reveals that the courts are still
reluctant to examine the reliability of forensic evidence when
proffered by the prosecution, and points out that reform is limited
without strong judicial enforcement. Part IV argues the need to apply
the Daubert standard leniently for defendants, both as a means of
leveling the playing field and as a way to improve forensic evidence
in general. Specific methods will be provided for analyzing the
qualification of experts and the relevance and validity of forensic
evidence.
II. RECENT DISCUSSIONS AND CHANGES IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
A. Forensic Science and Wrongful Convictions

For decades, there have been growing concerns about the
reliability of forensic science, mostly from academics.22 Starting in
the early 1990s, with the emergence of the Innocence Movement,
many scholars began in earnest to warn about the doubtful accuracy
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See infra Part IV.C.
19. See infra note 173–75 & accompanying text.
20. See infra note 162–66 & accompanying text.
21. See infra note 157–61 & accompanying text.
22. D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught
With Pitfalls, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 225, 225 (“For several decades now, many from the academy and
some from forensic science itself have pointed to weaknesses both in various forensic fields and in the
structure of forensic science practice itself—weaknesses that raised the specter of a forensic science that
sometimes made unwarranted claims and that could in practice sometimes aid in the conviction of the
innocent.”).
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of many forensic fields, even labeling some “junk science.”23
However, these efforts received scant attention. Even though some
flawed forensic science was proven to contribute to wrongful
convictions, it was generally regarded as merely the bad luck of the
convicted.24 And as Professor Michael Risinger indicated, “[these
problems] were generally dismissed without much examination by
the bulk of the forensic science establishment, and the proponents of
those claims were dismissed as well.”25 More seriously, many
criminal justice officials, and portions of the general public, were
reluctant to believe that exonerees were actually innocent.26 Thus,
after experiencing these tragedies, exonerees were not treated fairly
and compensation remained absurdly low.27
However, the status quo in forensic science was significantly
changed by the development of DNA technology.28 First, DNA
testing, which disproved findings in some of the other forensic
disciplines, confirmed nascent suspicions about many forensic
sciences.29 Because of its concrete scientific basis, exonerations by
DNA testing almost always included proof of actual innocence.
During the two decades following the first exoneration in 1989, 156
wrongfully convicted persons were freed after DNA testing, and 82
23. Paul C. Giannelli, Junk Science: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105
(1993) (urging a greater junk science discussion in criminal prosecution).
24. Lucian E. Dervan et al., Voices on Innocence, 68 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2747604 (claiming that before the DNA era,
“[wrongful convictions] were either ignored or treated as individual tragedies, one-offs, rather than as
illustrative of a criminal justice system that was structurally and persistently prone to factual error”).
25. Risinger, supra note 22, at 225.
26. One of the most infamous resistances to believe the actual innocence of exonerees is the coejaculation theory of the prosecutor in Texas. See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L.
REV. 1157, 1181 (2010) (“In Texas, after Roy Criner was convicted of a 1986 rape and murder of a
young girl, post-conviction DNA testing on semen from the victim's body excluded Criner. Nonetheless,
prosecutors resisted Criner's claim of innocence and convinced the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
that the DNA evidence was insufficient to prove innocence because Criner could have been wearing a
condom, failed to ejaculate, or the semen could have been from a prior consensual sexual encounteralthough those theories had never been presented in the case previously.”) (citation omitted).
27. John Shaw, Exoneration and the Road to Compensation: The Tim Cole Act and
Comprehensive Compensation for Persons Wrongfully Imprisoned, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 593
(2011) (discussing insufficient compensation for exonerees and proposing a reform model similar with
Texas case).
28. Dervan et al., supra note 24, at 7 (noting that “[t]he DNA exoneration cases in the 1990s and
2000s, of course, changed everything”).
29. As of now, among 349 DNA exoneration cases, 46% cases were found to involve the
misapplication of forensic science. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/dnaexonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). If one includes cases without DNA testing,
467 of 1976 wrongful convictions were attributable to problematic forensic science. See THE NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 1, 2017).
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of those cases involved flawed forensic evidence.30 It became
unacceptable to tolerate fallible forensic science and many legal
professionals, especially academics, increasingly recognized the need
for a scientific basis for forensic evidence.31 Unlike DNA evidence,
most traditional forensic evidence did not have a sufficient scientific
ground.32 When it came to forensic testimony, most actors in the
criminal justice system had long assumed that forensic scientists’
field experience and training background would guarantee
reliability.33 The comparatively rich scientific features of DNA
evidence, however, revealed the weak scientific basis of other
forensic evidence. Nonetheless, despite this awareness, significant
change in forensic fields has not happened.
Most would agree that 2009 was the watershed moment in forensic
science communities.34 When publishing the 2009 NRC Report, the
NRC severely criticized current forensic science practices and
confirmed many growing concerns.35 Particularly shocking to the
relevant communities was the harsh criticism in the report of forensic
methodology.36 The NRC wrote:
With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however, no forensic
method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a
connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.37

This meant that even fingerprint technology, which had long been
30. This data comes from one empirical study conducted in 2009. See Brandon L. Garret & Peter
J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009).
Here, the data of these two decades is given here because this section reviews changes before and after
the 2009 NRC Report.
31. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics: How forensic Science Lost
Its Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 149 (2008).
32. See infra note 51–65 & accompanying text.
33. Jennifer L. Mnookin, et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58
UCLA L. REV. 725, 745 (2011) (“In court, forensic analysts asked about the bases for their claims
frequently refer to experience and training rather than providing any systematic data. Experience is a
legitimate basis for certain kinds of knowledge, but it is deeply problematic for experience alone to be
the basis for sweeping claims like individualization. Moreover, without robust feedback mechanisms to
detect and provide information about any possible mistake, experience cannot be a sound warrant for
reaching valid conclusions.”) (citation omitted).
34. See, e.g., Mnookin, et al., supra note 33, at 729; D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report
on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught With Pitfalls, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 225, 225–26; William
C. Thompson, The National Research Council’s Plan to Strengthen Forensic Science: Does the Path
Forward Run through the Courts, 55 JURISMETRICS 35, 35–36 (2009).
35. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3.
36. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli et al., Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 55, 71, n.91 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 3d ed., 2011).
37. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 (emphasis added).
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considered the gold standard for evidence, could also be fallible.38
In its groundbreaking report, the NRC comprehensively reviewed
the principal forensic science disciplines (mostly involving trace
evidence) and noted the strengths and weaknesses of each forensic
field.39 The report also critically analyzed the admissibility of
forensic science.40 The NRC then listed suggestions for improving
reliability and strengthening oversight of forensic science.41 As a way
to implement these reforms, the NRC ambitiously suggested creation
of “an independent federal entity, the National Institute of Forensic
Science (“NIFS”).”42 The NRC believed that a new, independent
federal agency was necessary because existing forensic agencies in
the United State are too fragmented and no existing federal agency
possessed the requisite expertise and independence.43
The report’s recommendations generated huge political debates.44
In addition, many criminal justice professionals were antagonistic to
the report.45 It seemed that only a small number of scholars, with
minimal political power to realize change, were satisfied with the
report. Thus, big changes have not yet occurred. Instead of the
creation of new federal entity, a new forensics organization, in 2013,
National Commission on Forensic Science (“NCFS”),46 was
established through the cooperation of the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”).47 With the new organization, reforms on forensic science
are now on-going, although they are not as comprehensive as the
2009 NRC Report envisioned.

38. The most frequently cited case to support this claim might be the FBI’s infamous
misidentification in the Madrid bombing attack. See Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous
Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706,
706 (2004).
39. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, Part V.
40. Id. at Part III.
41. Id. at Part VI, VII, VIII.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id. at 14–18.
44. Risinger, supra note 22, at 238, 239 (discussing the conflict between Republicans and
Democrats in Congress).
45. Id. at 237, 239.
46. See Press Release, U.S. Departments of Justice and Commerce Name Experts to First-ever
National Commission on Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (Jan. 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/January/14-at-029.html.
47. Simon Cole & Gary Edmond, Science without Precedent: The Impact of the National
Research Council Report on the Admissibility and Use of Forensic Science Evidence in the United
States, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 585, 613 (2015).
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B. Why Forensic Science Had Remained Outdated and Yet Admissible in
Court

One may wonder why forensic science has remained so outdated,
even into the early 21st century. Given the remarkable development
of modern science, this lag in forensic science seems strange. One
may also wonder why the judicial system has consistently failed to
exclude flawed forensic evidence. If judges had scrupulously
reviewed the reliability of forensic evidence, they might have
prevented a significant number of wrongful convictions involving
problematic forensic science.
These points are particularly distinguishable from the development
of DNA evidence and jurisprudence regarding its admissibility.
Immediately after the advent of DNA technology, academics,
forensic science communities, and judiciaries endeavored to achieve
a high degree of certainty. Long before the 2009 NRC Report, the
NRC demonstrated a high level of interest in DNA, publishing two
reports in 1992 and 1996.48 The courts were also careful about
admitting DNA evidence because of its powerful influence on factfinders.49 Because of these efforts, most relevant professionals now
accept DNA evidence as the most reliable scientific evidence. It is
this high confidence in DNA evidence that has produced hundreds of
exonerations.50 Recognizing this short history of DNA evidence
helps one understand two distinct characteristics found in other types
of forensic evidence.
First, many forensic disciplines lack important features normally
found in scientific fields. These features are well explained in the
2009 NRC Report. The report noted that the scientific method
involves a series of systematic steps to accumulate data; continuous
observation, testing, and modification; methods to reduce errors and
bias; ultimate explanations of broad scientific principles; and so on.51
The report also listed key elements of good scientific practice when
creating new scientific theories.52 These elements include “precision
when defining terms, processes, context, results, and limitations;
48. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992); NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996).
49. Thompson, supra note 34, at 41-44 (explaining the courts’ careful approach in admitting
DNA evidence in the 1980s and 1990s).
50. But some criticize about blind faith in DNA evidence. See ERIN MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL:
THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA at xi (2015) (“Generally speaking, [the] enthusiasm for DNA typing
is not misguided, and it is not wrong. DNA typing is a marked advance over more primitive forensic
method. It does rely on scientifically established principles and mathematically sound statistics. . . . But
revolutionary does not mean infallible, and better does not mean faultless.”).
51. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 112.
52. Id.
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openness to new ideas, including criticism and refutation; and
protections against bias and overstatement (going beyond the
facts).”53 The report said that these principles for creating new
scientific knowledge could also be applied to the strengthening of
forensic science.54 These characteristics, which would make forensic
science more scientific, are rarely found in forensic disciplines.
This is because, historically, forensic science has been developed
and followed by forensic practitioners in police laboratories, rather
than by scientists in research institutions where most scientific
studies are conducted. Professor Jennifer L. Mnookin observed that
forensic scientists generally rely on “experience and training rather
than providing any systematic data” for “the bases [of] their
claims.”55 Also, forensic communities are “willing to infer scientific
validity from the fact of longstanding use.”56 These practices are far
from the normal scientific methods described above. Mnookin noted
that, “without robust feedback mechanisms to detect and provide
information about any possible mistake, experience cannot be a
sound warrant for reaching valid conclusions.”57 “Convictions,” she
emphasized, “do not necessarily establish the accuracy of the
evidence undergirding them.” 58 Thus, beyond anecdotal casework,59
53. Id. at 113.
54. Id. The report noted that:
In day-to-day forensic science work, the process of formulating and testing
hypotheses is replaced with the careful preparation and analysis of samples and
the interpretation of results. But that applied work, if done well, still exhibits the
same hallmarks of basic science: the use of validated methods and care in
following their protocols; the development of careful and adequate
documentation; the avoidance of biases; and interpretation conducted within the
constraints of what the science will allow.
Id.
55. Mnookin, et al., supra note 33, at 745.
56. Id. at 747.
57. Id. at 745.
58. Id. at 748 (“[T]he very fact that many kinds of pattern evidence are believed to be especially
powerful and persuasive proof makes inferring validity from its success dangerous. If a fingerprint error
leads to a misidentification, might the identified individual nonetheless be convicted, or even plead
guilty to avoid a stronger sanction at trial, in the face of evidence that seems virtually indisputable?”).
59. Mnookin carefully differentiates mere anecdotal caseworks from research. Id. at 749. She
notes that:
In addition, a research culture would realize that casework is not research. To be
sure, researchers may introduce research questions into the stream of what looks
to an analyst like ordinary casework. Covert research of this sort can provide
some of the most ecologically valid data about actual practices. Research could
also entail examining casework in a structured manner. But an analyst engaged in
ordinary casework is not herself conducting research. Casework may suggest
research problems worth exploring. It may lead to hypotheses worth developing.
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she argues forensic science disciplines need realistic and plausible
research plans.60
Second, rarely have the courts been concerned about the reliability
of forensic evidence, even after the emergence of the Daubert trilogy,
which established the comprehensive evidentiary standard for expert
testimony.61 The Daubert trilogy commands trial judges to scrutinize
the reliability of all expert testimony.62 On its surface, the Daubert
trilogy seemed to apply to all cases, whether civil or criminal.63 Thus,
criminal scholars wondered how this new standard would affect
forensic evidence in criminal cases.64 If applied properly, it was
expected to exclude most forensic evidence because of its weak
Unusual case findings may be worth discussing at professional meetings or
publishing as food for thought. Indeed, the International Association of
Identification (IAl) routinely publishes such materials in its journal, and they may
provide useful platforms for discussion and expand the experiential basis
available to practitioners. But case findings ought not to be mistaken for
structured research or empirical data that goes beyond the anecdotal, whether or
not such findings are published. Unlike planned research, casework does not
permit the development of careful controls, defined independent variables, or
structured and directed focus. Also, and critically, in casework, ground truth is not
known and cannot simply be inferred by a conviction, a confession, or the
consensus judgment of experts.
Id. at 749 (citation omitted).
60. Id. 749–50 (“We do not mean to set up an unrealistically idealized vision of real research.
Legitimate research can vary in its degree of formality and ecological validity. . . . But research does,
and must, involve explicit study design. And research reports and publications, comporting with the
research culture value of transparency, must be as explicit as is feasible about the nature of the study
design.”).
61. They are (1) Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), (2) General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 137 (1997), and (3) Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael 526 U.S.
136 (1999).
62. During the last half of the 20th century, as both the amount and importance of scientific
evidence increased, concerns over problematic scientific evidence and expert witnesses grew. The
Daubert trilogy addressed these problems. In 1993, the Court delivered a landmark decision, Daubert,
509 U.S. at 579, which ambitiously established a new admissibility standard for scientific evidence.
Daubert substitutes the “general acceptance” standard from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923), which had been the most commonly used standard for nearly 70 years. In Daubert, the Court
emphasized the judge’s “gatekeeping role” to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence. Daubert
suggested four non-exclusive factors for judges to consider when determining the reliability of scientific
evidence. In a subsequent decision, the Court articulated the appellate court’s review standard for a trial
court’s admission decision. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136. Finally, the Court expanded the scope Daubert’s
application and allowed judges to flexibly apply the Daubert standard. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 137. Kumho
held that expert testimony regarding technology and experience is also subject to the Daubert standard.
Id.
63. However, it is worth noting the fact patterns of the Daubert trilogy of cases. They all
addressed scientific causation and involved huge monetary damages.
64. Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some
Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S109 (2005) (“Many thought Daubert would be
the meaningful standard that was lacking in criminal cases and that it would serve to protect innocent
defendants.”).
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scientific basis. It is now well documented, however, that the
Daubert trilogy is less relevant in criminal cases than in civil cases.
Research shows that Daubert challenges are not widely litigated, and
are even less frequently successful, in criminal cases when compared
to civil cases.65 Thus, most forensic evidence easily passes Daubert
muster.
As Professor Paul C. Giannelli has noted, the reason the Daubert
trilogy does not rigorously apply to criminal cases is “not clear.”66
Commentators suggest several plausible reasons. Some point out the
fundamental weakness of the defendant in the adversarial system. 67
They also note the resource inequality between the prosecution and
the defense, and discovery rules that are disadvantageous to
defendants, as possible significant factors.68 Others claim that courts
are just afraid of letting guilty people go free. Courts have been
relying on these forensic sciences for so long it seems inconceivable
to many that they might be inadmissible for want of scientific
reliability. Thus, judges tend to readily admit forensic evidence by
relying on precedent, rather than doing a rigorous inquiry into the
reliability.69
Professor Christopher Slobogin provides a novel perspective.70 He
65. See id. at S113 (“Rules of admissibility promulgated by courts and legislatures do not
function well in a criminal justice system devoid of effective defense for indigent defendants.”).
66. Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, 26 CRIM. JUST. 61, 63 (2011) (“The
reasons for this state of affairs are not clear. Funding is no doubt part of the problem. Perhaps, judicial
inertia also plays a part.”).
67. See, e.g., Neufeld, supra note 64, at S110 (“Most criminal defendants are indigent. They are
represented by public defenders, contract defenders, and private lawyers paid minimal fees by the
government. In most states, before an assigned counsel can retain an expert to educate him or her,
review the opposing expert’s data or conduct independent testing, counsel must secure approval from
the presiding judge, an elected county official. The money to pay for the expert comes from a strained
county treasury, and judges are reluctant to authorize expenditures for experts.”); Keith A. Findley,
Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L.
REV. 893, 929–32 (2008).
68. See, e.g., Neufeld, supra note 64, at S110 (“The discovery available by statute and case law
to a defendant who is sued for money greatly exceeds the discovery available for a defendant facing
execution. In Texas, the state that leads the nation in executions, a criminal defendant is not by statute
entitled to see before trial the laboratory bench notes for tests conducted on the case evidence. All that
he gets is a conclusory report without the underlying notes. In Virginia, the state that is second to Texas
in executions, the state’s highest court has explicitly held that a defendant facing execution is prohibited
from reviewing the bench notes of the state forensic scientist who will be providing the most inculpatory
evidence at trial.”) (citation omitted); Findley, supra note 67, at 929–32.
69. See Findley, supra note 67, 950 (“Another consequence of leaving admissibility questions to
the adversary adjudicative process is that stare decisis can quickly become a substitute for analysis, and
can freeze judgments about science even if the science itself continues to evolve. To the extent that stare
decisis minimizes the need for repeated, case-by-case determination, it can do so in the wrong way—by
locking in misjudgments about science, and preventing fluid adaptation of admissibility or other legal
standards to reflect changing scientific knowledge.”).
70. Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss4/2

10

Kim: The Need for a Lenient Admissibility Standard for Defense Forensi

2018] A LENIENT STANDARD FOR DEFENSE FORENSIC EVIDENCE

1185

focuses on the different types of evidence that are usually introduced
by the prosecution and by the defense.71 He argues that the Daubert
factors72 are more amenable to the admission of “trace” evidence,
which is usually introduced by the prosecution.73 In contrast,
psychological testimony, as “softer” social science evidence, which is
frequently introduced by the defense, is inherently difficult to
establish under the Daubert factors.74 Thus, Slobogin notes that “the
move toward the scientific way of seeing the world is much better for
prosecutors than for criminal defendants.”75 Perhaps, this analysis in
part explains the unequal application of the Daubert trilogy to
criminal cases.
In sum, forensic science has been formed and developed by
forensic practitioners, instead of scientific research institutions.
Therefore, despite its long history and utilization, the scientific basis
has been relatively weak. Nevertheless, the courts have not
appropriately excluded this evidence, for a variety of social and
structural reasons. Because of these forces, forensic evidence has
maintained its weak scientific quality even into the 21st century.
C. Focus on Recent Changes

After the 2009 NRC report was published, this state of affairs
could no longer be ignored. Both problems are widely recognized:
(1) the scientific basis for forensic evidence is too weak, and (2) the
courts do not properly vet the reliability of forensic evidence.
However, recent focus in this area is rather disproportional. Most
reform efforts focus on strengthening individual forensic science
disciplines, while discussion about the admissibility of forensic
evidence is minimal.76
First, there have been changes in the forensic disciplines. The
2009 NRC Report had a huge impact on forensic practices; many
forensic practitioners take the report seriously. Collaborations have

105 (2003).
71. Id. at 108–23.
72. They are testability, error rate, the existence of standards, peer review and publication, and
general acceptance. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
73. Slobogin, supra note 70, at 108–18.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 108.
76. See, e.g., Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses
to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 301 (2013); Jules Epstein, Preferring the
“Wise Man” to Science: The Failure of Courts and Non-Litigation Mechanisms to Demand Validity in
Forensic Matching Testimony, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 81 (2014); Cole & Edmond, supra note 47.
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increased among forensic scientists to establish best practices.77 With
greater funding, more research has been conducted.78 Accreditations
for forensic labs and certifications for forensic scientists have also
been strengthened.79 Although the initial, ambitious recommendation
to establish a new federal institution was not realized, stronger ties
between forensic communities and academic institutions were
established.80
This is not to say that current efforts are sufficient for reforming
and strengthening forensic science. The 2016 PCAST Report
revealed this point.81 After reviewing more than 2,000 forensic
papers, the report found that many of the forensic feature-comparison
methods still lack sufficient empirical evidence to evaluate their
reliability under the Federal Rules of Evidence.82 Some scholars also
point out the insufficiency of forensic administrative reforms. For
instance, systematic audit processes of forensic labs are rare83 and the
efforts to measure the error rate of each forensic discipline are
scant.84 Problems with fragmented forensic laboratories and
administrative affiliations are not yet resolved.85 Nevertheless,
forensic communities are receiving unprecedented attention, both in
terms of quality and quantity. Especially, since the 2016 PCAST
77. COMM. ON STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE AT THE NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE
NAT’L ACADEMIES, IMPROVING THE SCIENTIFIC ROLE OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 6–9
(2015) [hereinafter THE SCIENTIFIC ROLE OF THE NIJ].
78. Id. at 1–3, 5–6.
79. Id. at 3,7.
80. Id.
81. See 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 10, at 1–14.
82. Id. at 1–2, 7–14 (noting that in bitemark analysis, footwear analysis, and microscopic hair
comparison, there is no empirical studies to support the scientific validity and reliability of the methods,
and there is only one empirical study in firearms analysis).
83. See Mnookin, et al., supra note 33, 746 n.49 (“[A]lthough the American Society of Crime
Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB) does audit some cases as part of
its accreditation process, this review takes place only once every five years, and cases reviewed are not
selected at random.”).
84. Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensics or Fauxrensics? Ascertaining Accuracy in the Forensic
Sciences, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1369, 1397 (2017) (“Studies to measure error and error rates will not be
treated as part of the profession’s basic research agenda.”).
85. See Risinger, supra note 22, at 237 (“Laboratories have been intertwined with police
organizations for too long to have the police organizations surrender control over them willingly. First,
just on a level of pure bureaucratic power, organizations do not easily agree to give up significant
centers of budget allocation, if for no other reason than that the bigger your budget is the more important
and powerful you are. In addition, there is the natural fear that the new arrangements will change the
relationship and the product in ways that law enforcement will not like-it may become less predictably
supportive of the desires of law enforcement to have particular outcomes ratified. Whatever the reasonsso far as I have been able to determine-few speaking for law enforcement agencies, prosecutorial
agencies, forensic science organizations, or forensic science publications have supported either
independence or the establishment of NIFS, and most that have spoken have opposed both.”) (citation
omitted).
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Report provided a comprehensive (and accurate86) status quo of
empirical evidence in each forensic discipline along with the clear
criteria for the reliability, further changes are highly expected.
In contrast, less attention is paid to the role of the courts with
respect to forensic science. This is partly because there seems to be a
broad consensus that the adversarial system is inadequate to filter out
flawed forensic evidence. The 2009 NRC Report touched upon this
point.87 It said that “[t]he adversarial process relating to the
admission and exclusion of scientific evidence is not suited to the
task of finding scientific truth.”88 The report articulated that several
reasons, such as “the rules governing the admissibility of forensic
evidence,” “the limitations of the adversary process,” and “the
common lack of scientific expertise among judges and lawyers[,]”
contribute to the courts’ ineffectiveness in dealing with forensic
evidence.89 Because of the recognition of the adversarial system’s
limitations, discussion of forensic evidence’s admissibility has been
relatively scant.
It might not be necessary to give an equal effort to both problems.
However, the present indifference to the admissibility issue should be
noted. It is true that the 2009 NRC Report primarily emphasized “a
tremendous need for the forensic science community to improve[,]”
while it merely assumed the that judicial control was unsuitable for
handling forensic evidence.90 But it is an exaggeration to frame the
report as abandoning the importance of the judiciary. The report
explains that “[j]udicial review, by itself, will not cure the infirmities
of the forensic community.”91 It is still necessary to establish the
appropriate role of the courts. With this in mind, the next part of this
article critically reviews the recent efforts of the courts.
86. On the same day that the 2016 PCAST Report published, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
noted that PCAST omitted to review numerous existing published studies, which support for the validity
of each forensic evidence. But DOJ ultimately concluded that there are no additional studies for PACST
to review. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI & TECH., AN ADDENDUM TO THE PCAST
REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS (Jan. 2017) [hereinafter 2017 PCAST
ADDENDUM],
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensics_adden
dum_finalv2.pdf
87. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 53. Moreover, many legal professionals consider that the impact of 2009 NRC Report
on legal practice should be limited. See Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 602 (“Most judges and courts
responded to the report on the basis that it was not a legal document, did not have much (for many,
anything) to say about specific legal (as opposed to forensic science) practice and that any revelations
could be adequately managed through conventional legal trial safeguards and protections (such as
vigorous cross-examination, rebuttal witnesses and careful instructions from trial judges).”).
90. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
91. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 2

1188

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT’S APPROACH
A. The Problem with Limited Court Review

It may be premature to assess the total reform efforts made by
forensic communities and courts. Because the 2009 NRC Report was
published only nine years ago, reforms are still in progress. However,
considering the exponential interest the report generated, nine years
is not that short a time. Indeed, in that time a number of empirical
studies have been conducted to review the changes made in response
to the report. In this section, the article first analyzes the recent
changes made by the courts, and then explores how the report has
affected the practices of forensic disciplines.
First, empirical research shows that the courts’ efforts in
scrutinizing the reliability of forensic evidence are still minimal.92
Changes in legal practice made as a result of the 2009 NRC Report
are much fewer than was expected.93
Professors Simon A. Cole and Gary Edmond conducted the most
recent and comprehensive study. Cole and Edmond studied the 2009
NRC Report’s direct effect on admissibility decisions in state and
federal cases.94 They compiled cases citing the 2009 NRC Report,
and found 82 cases decided between 2009 and 2014.95 After
reviewing these cases, they found two situations where defendants
were successful in challenging the prosecution’s forensic evidence.96
The first situation was in cases that used a presumptive drug test.97
Presumptive testing was regarded as a less reliable method for
analyzing unknown substances than gas chromatography-mass
spectrometry (“GC-MS”) analysis.98 Thus, Cole and Edmond found
that “[w]hen unequivocally reliable methods exist, courts seem

92. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 76, at 301 (“[T]o date, the [NRC] Report has not led any court
to conclude that evidence from any of these four disciplines is inadmissible.”); Epstein, supra note 76, at
101 (“[C]ourts have overwhelmingly declined to revisit admissibility determinations or circumscribe the
proposed testimony in pattern and impression evidence cases.”); Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 585.
93. See Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 613–15.
94. Id. at 585.
95. Id. at 592–94.
96. Id. at 598–601. Defendants were also successful with confrontation right challenges. Id.
However, because this paragraph discusses the reliability of forensic science, the confrontation right will
be discussed in the next section.
97. Id. at 599–600 (citing North Carolina v. Ward, 694 S.E.2d 738 (2010); Connecticut v.
Martinez, 69 A.3d 975 (2013)).
98. Id. at 599; 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 135. In this test, “chromatography separates
the drug from any diluents or excipients, and then mass spectrometry is used to identify the drug.” 2009
NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 135.
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unwilling to condone the use of insufficiently reliable methods.”99
The second situation was when “the change is in the way the expert’s
conclusion was expressed rather than exclusion.”100 Experts in those
cases were required to “make clear that the evidence they are
proffering is merely their opinion[,]”101 or “to temper the strength of
the claim.”102
Although these were positive effects of the NRC report, Cole and
Edmond discounted both situations.103 They concluded that the first
situation is very rare because, unlike most forensic techniques, GCMS analysis is a scientifically valid technique for testing unknown
substances, as the 2009 NRC report explicitly confirmed.104 They are
also skeptical of the second situation because a minimal change in
the phrasing of an expert’s conclusion would not cure “the lack of
validation testing and standardization at the heart of the NRC
critique.”105 Beyond these rare successes, according to the authors,
most challenges have failed.106 They concluded that “the most
unfortunate development in relation to forensic science evidence in
recent years is . . . the apparent reluctance of trial and appellate
judges to apply existing authority, particularly admissibility standards
(e.g., the Daubert criteria), more aggressively.”107
Because of these limits, some argue that more emphasis should be
given to improving the forensic disciplines before they get to the
courtroom. As Professor Keith A. Findley notes, “the most
efficacious approach might be to improve the quality of the evidence
upstream of the trial—during the police investigation.”108 This belief
is somewhat understandable, given that “the trial process has not
99. Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 599.
100. Id. at 600.
101. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Joyner. 4 N.E.3d 282, 289–90 (2014)) (noting that “[t]his is
sometime described as opinionization”) (emphasis added).
102. Id. (citing United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp.2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009)).
103. Id. at 599–601.
104. Id. at 599 (noting that “In these cases [the 2009 NRC report] is used as an authoritative
source for the limits of presumptive testing and the need for more reliable gas chromatography-mass
spectrometry (GC-MS) analysis in order to make scientifically-based conclusions about the type of
substances recovered by police officers” and that “in contrast to most of the forensic techniques
criticized in [the 2009 NRC report], the report confirmed the existence of a validated instrumental
technique for analyzing unknown substances that was widely available but had not been utilized by
investigators”).
105. Id. 601.
106. Id. 601–611.
107. Id. 616 (emphasis added).
108. Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Evidentiary
Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 758 (2013). Findley refers to a similar view in
Randolph N. Jonakait, Making the Law of Factual Determinations Matter More, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
673, 675 (1992).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

15

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 2

1190

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

proven to be very effective at sorting true from false evidence in
these suspect categories.”109 Also, since substantial efforts and
resources have been put into forensic fields since the 2009 NRC
Report, it is fair to expect that positive changes will take place sooner
or later. For these commentators, reforms in forensic practice are
expected to minimize “the strain on the truth-seeking functions of the
adversary adjudicative process.”110 Thus, although the current
admissibility standard for forensic evidence is lenient, successful
reforms in forensic disciplines are expected to not only improve
flawed forensic evidence but also weed out bad science from the
courts.
This approach, however, is a somewhat naïve expectation. The two
stages are influenced by each other; the relationship is not one-way.
If courts are willing to admit forensic science in its current state,
there is no urgent need (or incentive) for forensic communities to
conduct more rigorous scientific testing. Professor William C.
Thompson labelled this phenomenon as a “codependency” between
judges and forensic science.111 He explained that, “[l]ike parents who
are afraid to discipline a wayward teenager for fear of losing his love
and support, judges, by this account, are afraid to hold forensic
science to strict admissibility standards for fear of losing forensic
evidence.”112 According to Thompson, the lenient application of the
Daubert standard ultimately impedes the improvement of forensic
science. Strengthening forensic evidence without judicial “tough
love” might be nothing more than a pipedream.
In addition, courts have not been equally concerned with all the
Daubert factors. As Professor Jonathan J. Koehler pointed out,
although the Daubert Court listed “error rate” as one of the factors
for courts to consider, that factor has been neglected.113 This is
because, despite the importance of error rate in judging reliability,114
the Daubert trilogy did not provide clear criteria for lower courts to
judge error rate.115 Therefore, forensic disciplines have not cared
109. Findley, supra note 108, at 758.
110. Id. at 759.
111. Thompson, supra note 34, at 38.
112. Id. at 38–39. Thompson urged that “courts need to exercise a little ‘tough love’ and not
continue to tolerate (and thus enable) the deficiencies identified in the NRC report.” Id. at 39 n.14. He
continued that “Otherwise, . . . you'll be co-dependent forever.” Id.
113. Jonathan J. Koehler, supra note 84, at 5. Koehler suggests a new type of proficiency test to
identify error rates “under various real-world conditions,” because he thinks the current proficiency tests
are not adequate for measuring accuracy. Id. at 9.
114. Id. at 21 (noting that “error rate is the single most important component of a reliability
assessment”) (emphasis original).
115. Koehler noted that:
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much about measuring error rate. Even though the 2009 NRC Report
emphasized the rigorous estimation of error rate in the Daubert
factors,116 the forensic community has not changed much, largely
because the courts still believe that “the lack of reliable error rate is
not a serious problem.”117As Koehler indicated, “[i]n most areas of
forensic science, we can’t even begin to estimate accuracy rates (or
error rates).”118 Actually, the comprehensive review of forensic
literature analyzed in 2016 PCAST Report confirmed Koehler’s
assertion. The report found clear empirical evidence of the reliable
error rate in DNA analysis (for Single-Source and Simple-Mixture
Samples119) and Latent Fingerprint Analysis, and recognized some
limited evidence in Firearms Analysis, and DNA analysis (for
Complex Mixtures120).121 In other areas, the report found that there is
still no relevant empirical evidence.122
After all, forensic disciplines seem to have not yet embraced real
scientific features. Although the 2009 NRC Report emphasized the
need for independent and rigorous research, those efforts in the
National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”)—the most important forensic
research institution—are still limited.123 A recently published report
Although many courts that reviewed forensic science evidence under the Daubert
standard have tried to consider how well each of the five factors are met in the
target case, discussions of the error rate factor have largely been superficial. One
reason for this is that neither Daubert nor its progeny clarified what courts are
supposed to look for when they consider the “known or potential rate of error” of
a forensic method. A natural interpretation would seem to be that courts should
check to see if the casework error rate for a challenged forensic method is
sufficiently low in cases where error rate is a relevant consideration. But even if
this interpretation were correct and adopted by courts, key questions would
remain. What type of proof should courts rely on as proof of a low casework error
rate? How low is low enough? Does the evidentiary opponent have an obligation
to show that the error rate is insufficiently low? These questions, which have not
been addressed by the Court….
Id. at 20, 21.
116. 2009 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 117–22.
117. Koehler, supra note 84, at 28. After reviewing decisions addressing error rate issues, he
concluded that the 2009 NRC Report failed to bring “a sea change” to the measuring of error rates for
fingerprints, firearms and tool marks, or even DNA evidence. Id. at 23-28.
118. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
119. This analysis is “the vast majority of DNA analysis” and involves “samples from a single
individual or from a simple mixture of two individuals (such as from a rape kit).” 2016 PCAST Report,
supra note 84, at 7.
120. This analysis involves “complex mixture of biological samples from multiple unknown
individuals in unknown proportions. (Such samples arise, for example, from mixed blood stains, and
increasingly from multiple individual touching a surface).” Id.
121. See Id. at 7–14.
122. Id.
123. THE SCIENTIFIC ROLE OF THE NIJ, supra note 77, at 3. This report also explains “a unique

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 2

1192

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

found that “the priority issues emphasized in the [NIJ’s] solicitations
appear to be reactive,” and the current research “does not adequately
represent the needs of the broad range of forensic science
disciplines.”124 Even though new federal forensic agencies, like the
NCFS, were launched, they are consistently criticized for leadership
problems.125 In addition, even after the 2016 PCAST Report was
published, many forensic-science organizations still suggested that
“the validity and reliability of [forensic feature-comparison method]
could be established without actually empirically testing the method
in an appropriate setting.”126 However, as the report rightly noted,
“empirical testing is the only way to establish the validity and degree
of reliability of such an empirical method.”127 This wide spread
recognition in forensic communities would impede forensic science
to embrace real scientific features, even though the discussion about
the research culture at individual crime laboratories began.128
Therefore, in forensic science, it is still not clear whether the selfcorrection mechanism, one of the key features of science, can work
properly.
B. The Ineffectiveness of Strengthening Traditional Adversary Rights

Although there have been some efforts to strengthen tradition
adversary rights (constitutional protections), the effects may not be as
powerful as expected. Courts and scholars have recognized that the
Daubert standard is limited when responding to the deficiencies of
forensic science. Therefore, they have attempted to equip the defense
with tools for challenging the prosecution. In some sense, these tools
are expected to complement (1) insufficient reforms to the actual
reliability of forensic science and (2) lenient court review. However,
it is not clear to what degree these changes can combat the prejudicial
effect of flawed forensic evidence.129
The defense’s tools include confrontational rights and ineffective
and critical role” of National Institute of Justice in forensic science research. Id.
124. Id. at 4. The report recommends that the National Institute of Justice should “develop a
formal and comprehensive strategic plan for its forensic science research,” and “establish a research
advisory board that includes a broad array of scientists, including forensic science researchers and
practitioners.” Id. at 5.
125. See Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. judge quits commission to protest Justice Department forensic
science policy, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/us-judgequits-commission-to-protest-justice-department-forensic-science-policy/2015/01/29/cbed0a84-a7bb11e4-a2b2-776095f393b2_story.html?utm_term=.c8e03f815f77.
126. See 2017 PACST ADDENDUM, supra note 86, at 3–4.
127. Id. at 4.
128. See Mnookin, et al., supra note 33, at 775–78.
129. See Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 598–99.
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assistance of counsel claims. The Supreme Court quickly responded
to the 2009 NRC Report.130 In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that forensic evidence could not be
presented by certification or affidavit; forensic evidence must instead
be presented by live testimony subject to cross-examination.131 The
Court substantially cited the 2009 NRC Report and held that
defendants should have the right to confront forensic scientists.132 In
Hinton v. Alabama, the Court reinforced the defendant’s right to
effective assistance of counsel when using and challenging forensic
science. 133 It held that counsel’s failure to seek additional funding to
hire a better expert constituted deficient performance and prejudiced
the defendant.134 As Professor Brandon L. Garrett noted, “the
[Hinton] Court had strengthened the obligations of defense counsel to
litigate forensics.”135
However, these enhanced rights are doubtful to be ineffective at
screening forensic evidence. This is not to say that strengthening
those rights are meaningless; they are the valuable fruits of recent
efforts to improve forensic evidence. It might be also true that the
Court has made sincere efforts in areas where it has a high
institutional competence. Nevertheless, as co-chairs of the Senior
Advisors to the PCAST Working Group, Judge Harry T. Edwards
and Professor Jennifer L. Mnookin noted, “experience has shown
that, at least in criminal trials, the suggestion that the adversarial
system represent an adequate means of demonstrating the
unreliability of forensic evidence is mostly fanciful.”136 Perhaps,
130. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 317–21 (2009).
131. Id. The petitioner argued that the admission of forensic certificates in lieu of live testimony
of the forensic analysts who conducted the forensic examinations at issue violated his confrontation
right under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 308–9. The Court first determined the class of testimonial
statements by citing Crawford v. Washington. Id. at 309–10 (discussing types of testimonial evidence)
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)). Because “[t]he documents at issue here,
while denominated by Massachusetts law ‘certificates,’ are quite plainly affidavits,” the Court reasoned,
“[t]hey are incontrovertibly a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact.” Id. at 310 (some quotation marks and citations omitted). The majority rejected the
dissenting opinion arguing that there has been an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific
evidence, and deemed the opinion as mere an attempt to resurrect Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
(holding that the adequate indicia of reliability is required for hearsay to meet the Confrontation Clause
standard), which was overruled by Crawford five years before Melendez-Diaz. Id. at 312–13. Crawford
overruled Roberts by differentiating testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
132. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318.
133. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014).
134. Id. at 1088–89. Although additional funding to hire an expert was available at the time of
trial, counsel mistakenly believed that the “funding was capped at $1,000.” Id. at 1088. The Court held
that the defense counsel failed to introduce a competent tool mark examiner. Id. at 1089.
135. Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1147, 1148–49 (2016) (citing Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1088 (2014)).
136. Harry T. Edwards and Jennifer L. Mnookin, A wake-up call on the junk science infesting our
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these changes could be partial remedy and may fail to counteract
insufficiently reviewed forensic evidence.
In a similar vein, there are efforts to enhance Brady obligations.137
For instance, in 2015, the West Virginia Supreme Court extended
Brady obligations to plea negotiations.138 In Buffey v. Ballard, the
court held that the suppression of exculpatory DNA evidence in plea
negotiations violated the defendant's due process rights.139 Some
scholars also argue that forensic “laboratories [should] consider
extending something akin to Brady duties to [forensic] examiners
themselves.”140 Given that Brady is already applied to the
information that police possess, they argue, “there is no reason that
this should not apply to forensic scientists.”141 These proposals are
valuable in terms of fundamental fairness.142 However, the extension
of Brady obligations to pre-plea discovery is only limited to one
small state, West Virginia, and the discussion of applying Brady
duties to scientists has just started.
IV. POLICY DIRECTION
A. The Need to Read Daubert Leniently for Defendants

The reliability of forensic evidence will not be strengthened
without external pressure—and in particular, without pressure from
the courts. Also, it is not clear if enhancing traditional trial rights will
help to filter out forensic evidence with a weak scientific grounding.
Thus, the courts should consider more influential changes.
A simple solution would be urging the strict review of scientific
reliability, as the Daubert standard was initially expected to bring. It
courtrooms, WASH. POST, Sep. 20, 2016 (internal quotation mark omitted and emphasis added),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-wake-up-call-on-the-junk-science-infesting-ourcourtrooms/2016/09/19/85b6eb22-7e90-11e6-8d13d7c704ef9fd9_story.html?utm_term=.b7c0b91c3842.
137. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the
prosecution to provide exculpatory evidence to the defense).
138. Buffey v. Ballard, 2015 WL 7103326 (W.Va. 2015).
139. Id.
140. Mnookin, et al., supra note 33, at 776. This article articulates the reason in this way: “[T]here
is no reason that [Brady violation] should not apply to forensic scientists. . . . The purpose of either a
disclosure requirement or enhanced reporting norms is in part to increase the degree of perceived and
subjectively felt independence from law enforcement, even if no formal institutional realignment takes
place.” See id.
141. Id. (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995)). They expect this duty to increase “the
degree of perceived and subjectively felt independence from law enforcement,” which would lessen the
“structural risks of both bias and partisanship stem[ming] from the institutional location of crime
laboratories.” Id. at 774, 776.
142. Id. at 776.
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is, however, somewhat unrealizable. Cole and Edmond openly
describe their perception about how legal professionals might
recognize forensic reform. They note that:
Most lawyers and judges seem to believe that when it comes to the
forensic sciences the current approach to admissibility standards—
a relatively light touch in response to expert opinion evidence
adduced by the state that effectively circumvents interest in
validity and reliability—is sufficient, indeed appropriate.
Demanding interpretations of Daubert are not applied to the state's
forensic science evidence. For most prosecutors, judges, forensic
analysts as well as the public at large, notwithstanding high profile
wrongful convictions exposed through innocence projects, the
overall rate of legal mistakes can be understood as miniscule, and
used to valorize extant legal traditions and practice in support of a
preference for gradual engagement and reform on a case by case
basis.143

This widespread recognition among legal practitioners shows the
inherent difficulty in depending on a strict application of reliability
review to forensic evidence.
Meanwhile, the current practices negatively impact defendants. As
explained above, courts tend to apply a lenient standard only when
admitting the state's forensic science evidence. As Professor David L.
Faigman noted, it is the prosecution that is often allowed to present
forensic evidence without a minimal scientific basis.144 For example,
drug detectives usually testify about their special knowledge, without
any empirical basis; their testimonies mostly rely on their training
and longtime experience.145 Such testimony is usually admitted.146
143. Cole & Edmond, supra note 47, at 616 (citing Scalia J. in Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516
(2006)) (emphasis added).
144. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 1 MOD. SCI. EVIDENCE § 1:35, Applying Daubert: Criminal
cases (2017–2018 Edition), Westlaw (database updated December 2017) (noting that:
An important issue pertinent to Daubert's application to criminal cases concerns
the rigor with which courts will assess forensic evidence. Prosecutors rely heavily
on empirical techniques that remain largely untested, techniques, such as
handwriting identification and bitemarks, that have a long tradition of admission,
but whose continuing vitality under Daubert remains in doubt. Indeed, the vitality
of Daubert itself might be assessed on whether the courts embrace the
gatekeeping function seriously enough to challenge forensic scientists to live up
to the title scientist).
145. See Joelle Anne Moreno, What Happens When Dirty Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for
the Prosecution, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 33–35 (2004) (“There is no indication in any related literature that
there has ever been a real effort to study or test the reliability of any drug jargon definitions.”). Id. at 34.
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The same is true regarding the prosecution’s social syndrome
evidence (e.g., Shaken Baby Syndrome) despite lacking a concrete
scientific basis.147 It only dubiously clears the Daubert standard, but
is nonetheless routinely admitted, largely because of conventional
practice.148
In contrast, defense-proffered evidence tends to be scrutinized
more strictly. Professor D. Michael Risinger conducted an in-depth
empirical study of state and federal cases after Daubert. 149 For
criminal cases in federal district courts, he found that two-thirds of
the prosecution challenges to defense proffers were accepted (28/42),
but only 8% of defense challenges to prosecution proffers were
accepted (1/11).150 Risinger also noted that “[e]vidence from state
courts does not reveal a greatly dissimilar pattern.”151 A more recent
study, conducted by Professor Jennifer L. Groscup, revealed an even
more strikingly disproportionate result.152 It revealed that more than
95% of the prosecution’s forensic experts are admitted at trial, while
fewer than 8% of the defense’s forensic experts are allowed to
testify.153 Of course, as Risinger points out, the reliability of the
defense’s forensic evidence may be relatively weak compared to the
prosecution’s, and dissimilar litigation strategies could also
contribute to this disparity.154 Nevertheless, the dramatic differences
raise strong suspicions about the unequal application of Daubert
146. See id. at 3.
147. Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the
Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 34 (2009) (“the scientific underpinnings of SBS have
crumbled over the past decade as the medical establishment has deliberately discarded a diagnosis
defined by shaking.” Id. at 11; Findley, supra note 67, at 920 (discussing the weak scientific basis of
Rape trauma syndrome evidence).
148. Tuerkheimer, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. at 34. (“[I]t is . . . quite likely that judges are allowing
this type of testimony because our justice system is structured in a way that makes its admission the
default. “[T]he standard for admissibility is relevance and reliability, not certainty,” as courts often
remark when allowing SBS testimony.” (quoting People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 322 (Colo. 2003)).
149. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty
Being Left on the Dock, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000).
150. Id. at 109–10.
151. Id. at 110. In analyzing state courts, he did not separate the trial court and the appellate court.
Id. at 111 n.42.
152. See Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 (2002).
153. Id. at 346. His data, 693 criminal cases, includes both federal and state courts. Id. at 344.
154. Risinger, supra note 149, at 108 (“Of course, none of this goes directly to the validity of any
given decision, and because different forms of expertise are commonly proffered in civil and criminal
cases, these numbers do not directly establish disparate standards of dependability in the two contexts,
but they are fairly striking in their own right. Maybe it is true that the prosecution always proffers highly
dependable expertise, and that criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs usually proffer garbage, or that
prosecutors and civil defendants only object to low quality proffers whereas criminal defendants (and to
a lesser extent civil plaintiffs) object to demonstrably dependable evidence as a matter of course.”).
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standards. At present, there is no clear evidence that this situation has
improved.
To reiterate: the courts have shown no willingness to strictly apply
Daubert in criminal cases; deeply rooted norms in the legal
profession create additional, practical difficulties when applying the
Daubert standard against government forensic evidence; and the
courts, whether consciously or unconsciously, review the reliability
of evidence in a way that is unfair to the defendant.
A change of focus is required. This article argues that courts
should consciously apply a more permissive standard towards
defendants’ forensic evidence. A permissive application of Daubert
would give defendants more opportunities to introduce their own
forensic experts, who may then present their own interpretations of
evidence or rebut government witnesses. This helps defense to
implement a larger variety of strategies; the defense expert may
support the defendant’s claims with independent data, or point out
the weaknesses in government’s expert testimony; and the defense
expert can also expand the scope of discussion and analyze the
reliability, weight, and even the credibility of government evidence.
Perhaps, the existing perception that adversary system does not work
properly for filtering problematic forensic evidence mostly points out
the ineffectiveness of cross-examination by defense attorneys.
Although it is sometimes an efficient tool to discredit the
prosecution’s forensic evidence, generally, a limited range of subject
is covered during the lawyer’s cross-examination.155 On the contrary,
expert analysis is likely to go well beyond defense counsel’s crossexamination.
Defense experts can also help strengthen the reliability of forensic
evidence. Not guilty verdicts usually reflect the jury’s
underappreciation for the weight of the evidence in question. The
government is then encouraged to provide more rigorous evidence if
it struggles to obtain convictions. Prosecutors would ensure that their
evidence is fully acceptable under the Daubert standard. They would
also push (1) to rectify the comprehensive issues pointed out in the
2009 NRC Report and particularly (2) to pursue “empirical studies
designed to test error rates and accuracy in conditions akin to those

155. Lawyers wish to avoid discussion about unfamiliar concepts, which might fall within the
expertise of witnesses. James W. McElhaney, Cross-Examining Expert Witnesses, 3 LITIGATION 41, 44
(1977). Instead, the lawyer usually attempts to control the style of the witness’ response. Id. at 43. At the
beginning of cross-examination, counsel requires an opposing expert to answer only “yes or no” to all
questions. Id. By doing this, defense counsel usually discourages a witness’s non-responsive answer and
overcomes the shortage of professional knowledge in forensic disciplines. Id. at 43–44. Sometimes, this
is a very effective strategy. However, it narrows the scope of cross-examination.
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found in the real world” in 2016 PCAST Report.156 Such efforts
would gradually increase the reliability of government evidence.
The history of DNA evidence that obtained the present high
reliability through “the DNA war” may support this claim. In the late
1980s, DNA technology was rapidly developing and started being
presented in court.157 Defendants challenged the admissibility of
DNA evidence and courts held the government to more rigorous
scientific standards.158 This was made possible by defense experts,
who carefully targeted the unsupported claims of prosecution
experts.159 Although there was some resistance from law
enforcement, forensic scientists began to use more conservative,
scientifically rigorous methods.160 Professor William C. Thompson
cites DNA as evidence that “successful challenges to the
admissibility of forensic evidence are helpful in achieving
improvements in forensic science.”161 Like the DNA war, attacks
from defense experts on other types of forensic evidence are expected
to ultimately improve the underlying science.
Adversarial court challenges mirror the scientific method, and
therefore adversarial testing can be implemented to improve
scientific theories. According to Karl Popper, whom the Court relied
upon when establishing the Daubert standard,162 “statements or
systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be
capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable observations.”163
Popper regarded scientific progress as the result of proving that good
ideas are wrong, so that they can be replaced by even better ideas.164
He famously labeled this process as “falsification.”165 A similar point
is found in the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, which most
156. Edwards & Mnookin, supra note 136.
157. See William C. Thompson, The National Research Council’s Plan to Strengthen Forensic
Science: Does the Path Forward Run Through the Courts?, 50 JURMETRICS J. 35, 40-41 (2009).
158. See id.
159. See id. at 41, 44.
160. Professor Thompson noted that “[a]lthough these rulings caused an atmosphere of crisis in
the law enforcement community and were characterized by some as a judicial rejection of science, the
rulings did not actually prevent lawyers from making use of DNA evidence.” Id. at 42. He continued
that “[i]n some jurisdictions, DNA laboratories began using a more conservative method for computing
the frequency of DNA profiles” that recommended by prestigious scientific institution. Id.
161. Id. at 44.
162. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Conjectures and Exhumations: Citations of History,
Philosophy and Sociology of Science in US Federal Courts, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 309, 310–29
(2002).
163. Sven Ove Hansson, Science and Pseudo-Science, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Sep. 3, 2008) (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS. THE GROWTH OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 39 (1962)), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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federal judges rely on. In that manual, Professor David Goodstein
explains that “[science] is an arena in which ideas do battle, with
observations and data the tools of combat.”166 As noted, forensic
science lacks this combative process, because it is usually developed
in a government crime lab for targeted use in criminal litigation.167
Defense experts allow forensic evidence to be more frequently tested
in an adversarial setting and ultimately strengthen its scientific basis.
Shaken Baby Syndrome (“SBS”) cases are a good example of the
process this article envisions. According to Professor Keith A.
Findley, SBS cases present a stark example of judicial reliance on
forensic science, because these are cases “where the science is used
to prove all elements of the crime.”168 Although the prosecution’s
SBS evidence usually has weak scientific grounding,169 it has passed
Daubert muster without serious difficulty so far.170 Trial judges may
not be willing to reject SBS evidence, because it is the best available
evidence the prosecution can offer. This generous application of
Daubert helps the prosecution secure convictions. However, since the
courts continue to admit SBS evidence with a weak scientific basis,
and that evidence convicts defendants, the state is discouraged from
changing its practices. If the defendant’s expert testifies in the courts,
the battle of experts will effectively reveal the weaknesses of
prosecution’s SBS evidence. Even if the testimony of the defense
expert is shaky, it can be easily explored by “[v]igorous crossexamination and presentation of contrary evidence.”171 This kind of
information would be “of genuine assistance to the trier.”172 Given
the narrow pool of experts available to the defense, a more
permissive version of the Daubert standard will help the defense
submit more forensic evidence to the court. And this would
166. David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
34, 44 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 3th ed., 2011).
167. See supra note 55–60 & accompanying text.
168. Keith Findley et al., Examining Shaken Baby Syndrome Convictions in Light of New Medical
Scientific Research, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 219, 223 (2012).
169. See Keith A. Findley, et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual
Innocence: Getting It Right, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209, 298–306 (2012) (discussing weak
scientific basis of SBS testimony).
170. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the Scientific (And
Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 156, 165–69 (2010) (explaining that SBS evidence became
admissible in most court in a short time); Jennifer E. Laurin, Criminal Law's Science Lag: How
Criminal Justice Meets Changed Scientific Understanding, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1771 (2015) (“While
courts have begun to view the prior consensus about a unique etiology of shaken-baby injuries as
undermined by developments in the medical field, the prosecutorial community has been far more
skeptical.”).
171. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993); see Rock v.
Arkanasa, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987).
172. Imwinkelried, supra note 170, at 185.
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ultimately encourage the adversary testing of government evidence.
Opponents might argue that this proposal is logical but lacks legal
grounds. But there is indeed jurisprudential support for this approach.
Some scholars emphasize the exclusive constitutional right for
defendants to present material evidence, a right that the prosecution
does not enjoy.173 Professor Janet Hoeffel argues that the criminal
defendant enjoys this right under the Sixth Amendment’s
Compulsory Process Clause.174 Professor Katherine Goldwasser
asserts that jury trials were intended to allow “the unusual,
unexpected, or even implausible stories” of criminal defendants. 175
Above all, they argue that there is a constitutional justification for a
very lenient threshold for evidence presented by defendants.
Judges also have the discretion to apply the admissibility rules
leniently. The Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”), are generally
considered to create a lenient standard for admitting expert
testimony.176 When Daubert abolished the Frye test, the Court was
recognizing that the FRE rule on expert evidence could create a more
lenient standard.177 Thus, although the positivist approach in the
Daubert trilogy caused a stricter admissibility standard,178 the rule’s
original intent was in part to lower the standard.179 Also, both
Daubert and Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael explicitly
acknowledge the broad discretion of trial judges.180 This discretion,
173. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002
WIS. L. REV. 1275 (2002); Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the
Requirement of Proof beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom about
Excluding Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621 (1998).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”); Hoeffel, supra note 173, at 1360–61
(“While the one-sided application of a favorable constitutional standard may appear unfair, it is not. In a
criminal case, the parties are assumed to be on an unequal footing. The bundle of rights in the Sixth
Amendment—the right to notice, counsel, confrontation and compulsory process—were intended to
offset the inherent imbalance between the relatively powerful State and the powerless, resourceless
defendant. The parties are also on an unequal footing, however, because the defendant's very liberty is at
stake. The criminal justice system was designed to reflect the most undesirable verdict as that of the
conviction of the innocent.”) (citation omitted).
175. Goldwasser, supra note 173, at 639.
176. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (noting that the “drafting history [of Federal Rule of Evidence 702]
makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid general acceptance requirement would be at odds with the liberal
thrust of the Federal Rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion
testimony”) (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)) (quotation marks
omitted).
177. Id.
178. Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.
105, 106–7 (2003).
179. Hoeffel, supra note 173, at 1359 (“Daubert meant to liberalize the rules of evidence
governing the admissibility of scientific evidence and intended that ‘shaky but reliable’ evidence be
submitted to the jury.”)
180. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-592; Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 136,
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combined with the constitutional grounds discussed above, creates a
concrete theoretical basis for applying forensic admissibility
standards more leniently towards defendants. Based on this analysis,
this article’s suggestion could be achieved without seismic changes.
B. Methods for Lenient Admissibility

Critics might argue that a more lenient standard would allow too
much unreliable forensic evidence to be admitted into court—a
concern that there will be no limit to admissibility. Permitting
fundamentally unreliable evidence would conflict with the clear
dictates of Daubert. As General Electric Co. v. Joiner181 observed,
“nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”182 To address this concern,
this article formulates specific standards to avoid opening the door to
groundless forensic evidence. Although this is an inherently difficult
task; tension always arises where law and science meet,183 fortunately
the scholarship on “law and science” is very rich. Based on these
studies, some examples of specific standards, although not exclusive,
will be discussed below.
This will be examined from two dimensions: (1) The qualification
standard of forensic scientists; and (2) the validity of the forensic
evidence. For the first dimension, the qualifications of experts should
be evaluated to include witnesses with expertise in fields that are
adjacent or relevant to testimony proffered by the prosecution. The
situation is when competing experts are discussing the same
evidence, but their expertise is different. For example, consider the
following hypothetical:
The prosecutor prepares a bitemark forensic expert in a rape case.
The defense counsel, however, has difficulty in finding an
appropriate bitemark expert in the community. Accordingly,

152–53 (1999).
181. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
182. Id. at 146.
183. This is because law and science differ essentially. Law pursues justice in individual cases,
whereas science seeks truth through valid generalization. Law must make timely and final decisions for
efficient dispute resolution, whereas truth from scientific research is never absolute or ultimate. Because
of these differences, there is tension when science meets law in the courtroom. In this vein, Professor
David Goodstein once noted that “[t]he presentation of scientific evidence in a court of law is a kind of
shotgun marriage between the two disciplines.” See Goodstein, supra note 166, at 52 (Federal Judicial
Ctr. ed., 3rd ed., 2011). This conflict may be especially striking in criminal cases where the life and
liberty of human beings are at stake.
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defense counsel decides to hire a statistician as an alternative
expert, because he knows that the scientific basis for the
individualization claimed by the prosecution’s expert is weak. The
statistician tries to show that there is no statistical basis for the
individualization claims largely based on her own research of the
existing literature. However, the defense counsel is concerned that
the statistician does not have any expertise in bite mark evidence
(e.g., degree, training, publication or prior testimony).184

In this case, the statistician’s lack of expertise with bite mark
evidence should not be an insurmountable obstacle. If a defendant’s
expert testimony provides information that can help the jury make a
judgment—to weigh the prosecution’s individualization claim—it
should be allowed.
This proposal can bring positive changes. A wide range of experts
will continuously point out the problem—the lack of scientific basis
in forensic evidence—and help to expose the true picture of forensic
science to decision makers. Especially, the core issues discussed in
the 2016 PCAST Report (foundational validity,185 validity as
applied186) could be more scrutinized in the courtroom. Further, an
active involvement of other field experts will ultimately propel
forensic disciplines to achieve the ultimate objective of enhancing the
accuracy of forensic evidence. In some sense, this aspect also
reconciles with the point in 2016 PACST Report, which emphasized
the need for collaboration with non-forensic scientists.187
State v. Romero provides valuable lessons in evaluating the
qualifications of experts.188 In Romero, the defense presented an
experimental-design expert to criticize “the scientific reliability of
drawing conclusions by comparing toolmarks.”189 Although he was a
nationally known experimental design expert, the trial court excluded
184. This is a hypothetical scenario created by the author.
185. Foundational validity means “the scientific standard corresponding to the legal standard of
evidence being based on ‘reliable principles and methods.’” 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 10, at 43.
186. Validity as applied means “the scientific standard corresponding to the legal standard of an
expert having ‘reliably applied the principles and methods.’” Id.
187. See 2017 PACST ADDENDUM, supra note 86, at 9 (“In addition, progress would be advanced
by the creation of a cross-cutting Forensic Science Study Group—involving leading forensic and nonforensic scientists in equal measure and spanning a range of feature-comparison disciplines—to serve as
a scientific forum to discuss, formulate and invite broad input on (i) empirical studies of validity and
reliability and (ii) approaches for new technology development, including transforming subjective
methods into objective methods. Such a forum would complement existing efforts focused on
developing best practices and informing standards and might strengthen connections between forensic
disciplines and other areas of science and technology.”).
188. State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 365 P.3d 358 (2016).
189. Id. at 361.
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his testimony because he had “never conducted a toolmark analysis,
never attempted to identify different firearms, and never conducted
research on firearm identification.”190 The Arizona Supreme Court
reversed the decision. The court reasoned that the defense expert was
qualified because his testimony was confined to analysis of the
experimental aspect of the government’s forensic evidence.191 The
court regarded the expert as qualified to evaluate the evidence, even
though he was not a pure expert of the specific field of evidence.
Like Romero, the qualifications of a defense expert do not need to be
too high, so long as he can analyze some aspect of the particular
evidence. This mitigated standard allows a discussion of forensic
evidence from a variety of angles.
In a similar vein, the interpretation of “task at hand” also needs to
be flexible when applied to a defense expert. In Kumho Tires, the
Court emphasized the “task at hand,” requiring specific expertise on
the issues in question.192 Experts must demonstrate their specific
expertise on the key issues, rather than general expertise in the
relevant area.193 Unfortunately, Kumho Tires allows an overly narrow
interpretation of “task at hand.”194 When judges strictly apply the
element against the defendant, it can create difficulty for the defense
to find a suitable expert.
This article has more to say about the second dimension, which
addresses the validity of forensic evidence. When judging validity of
forensic evidence, there should be different standards depending on
the type of science. In a broad view, forensic evidence can be divided
into two types: Framework evidence and diagnostic evidence,195 but
the difference has rarely been discussed as a factor of admissibility in
courts.196 Framework evidence “is a product of research that applies
generally to all similarly situated cases,” and diagnostic evidence “is
relevant to particular cases that might be instances of the general
findings.”197 Put simply, the former generalizes the world and
provides society with a general framing of an issue, and the latter
applies the former to a specific case. Framework science is not
190. State v. Romero, 236 Ariz. 451, 459, 341 P.3d 493, 501 (Ct. App. Div. 2 2014).
191. Romero, 239 Ariz. at 10.
192. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., §37:22. Daubert admissibility – Expert Qualifications – Task-athand and scope of expertise, 5 MOD. SCI. EVIDENCE (2017–2018 Edition), Westlaw (database updated
December 2017).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i)
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 422–24 (2014).
196. Id. at 419–20.
197. Id. at 424.
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necessarily more reliable, but it is inherently more scientific in the
sense that it pursues a generalization.198 It follows a scientific process
to generate knowledge. Under this proposal, prosecutorial evidence
would be challenged by the same scientific process.
This approach, which considers the types of science, has an
additional advantage. The allegiance of experts in the adversarial
system has long been a serious problem, and may detract from the
search for truth.199 Framework evidence involves less risk for
improper allegiances, because it inherently pursues generalization
(i.e., a scientific theory), and juries are less prone to being misled. In
contrast, intuitively, diagnostic evidence is more vulnerable to party
allegiances, because it asks the expert to apply general principles to
the very dispute at issue. In fact, empirical studies on the allegiance
of experts within the adversarial system mostly focus on diagnostic
evidence. 200 Perhaps, fact-finders can be more easily swayed by this
kind of expert testimony.
Here, this article adds one more ambitious proposal that helps
lower the validity standard for defense experts: A more permissible
standard for the presentation of multiple forensic studies. Although
the courts have rarely discussed this kind of issue, the Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence directly addresses this.201 The manual
raises the question of “[w]hen there is a Daubert challenge to an
expert, should the court look at all the studies on which the expert
relies for their collective effect or should the court examine the
reliability of each study independently?”202 It finds that “some
[courts] appear to look at each study separately”203 and that Joiner
can be interpreted as supporting this “slicing-and-dicing”
approach.204 However, the manual points out that “scientific
inference typically requires consideration of numerous findings,
198. See id. at 425 (“The most important difference in this calculus is that diagnostic testimony
cannot be admissible unless the relevant framework is also admissible, whereas the converse is not true.
Even if framework evidence is admissible, extrapolation from it to the individual case may not be
scientifically or legally justifiable.”).
199. Experts have long been seriously criticized for their tendency to testify in favor of the party
that retained them rather than objectively delivering their expertise. Despite concerns about the expertdominated trial, the use of expert witnesses at trial has been continuously increasing. See, e.g., Jennifer
L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009
(2008).
200. See, e.g., Daniel C. Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts Biased by the Side that Retained
Them?, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1889 (2013).
201. Margaret A. Berger, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 11, 19 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 3th ed., 2011).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)).
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which, when considered alone, may not individually prove the
contention.”205 It relies on the authorities of reputable institutions.
[M]any of the most well-respected and prestigious scientific bodies
. . . consider all the relevant available scientific evidence, taken as
a whole, to determine which conclusion or hypothesis regarding a
causal claim is best supported by the body of evidence. In applying
the scientific method, scientists do not review each scientific study
individually for whether by itself it reliably supports the causal
claim being advocated or opposed. Rather, . . . summing, or
synthesizing, data addressing different linkages between kinds of
data forms a more complete causal evidence model and can
provide the biological plausibility needed to establish the
association being advocated or opposed.206

Given the consensus in scientific communities, a more permissible
standard should be applied to multiple forensic studies. With this
generous approach, defendants could introduce more forensic
evidence.
C. Refutations to Counter Arguments

Even if one agrees with this article’s proposal, one might still be
concerned with whether it is a realistic possibility. An asymmetric
standard, deliberately favorable to defendants, would inevitably meet
resistance.207 Especially, given the political climate of the American
criminal justice system, it would be challenging to implement such
an idea.208 The prosecution already has a high burden of proof, and is
required to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.209 A proposal imposing an additional disadvantage on the
prosecution may have difficulty winning public approval.
205. Id. at 19–20 (citation omitted).
206. Berger, supra note 201, 20 (emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As for
“well-respected and prestigious scientific bodies.” the Manual lists following institutions: “the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), the Institute of Medicine, the National Research
Council, and the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences.” Id.
207. See, e.g., Roger C. Park, Daubert on a Tilted Playing Field, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1113,
1115–17 (2003) (noting the legal and social problems that “asymmetrical approach” are expected to
bring).
208. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 780 (2006). In addition, the prosecution already has a high burden of proof, which requires the
state to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. That being so, it might be
practically difficult to adopt an additional different standard that is more favorable to defendants.
209. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required
for criminal convictions).
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This article’s approach, however, has a clear strength. It has
addressed (1) the weak scientific basis for forensic evidence and the
court’s insufficiency in reviewing its reliability,210 (2) the minimal
changes made after the 2009 NRC Report,211 and (3) the need to
facilitate adversarial testing of evidence in the courts by lowering the
standard of admissibility for defendants.212 The asymmetric standard
is an appeal to science, and it may be more acceptable to the public
when framed that way. The reason that forensic evidence has gained
the public trust (e.g., CSI effect) is that forensic evidence seems more
scientific than traditional evidence. If an asymmetric admissibility
standard would truly harmonize forensics with other scientific fields,
the public would be open to the suggestion. The same is true for legal
practitioners. Most lawyers want their proffered expert testimony to
have (at least seemingly) scientific grounds. Legal professionals
endeavored to inject scientific features into law over 150 years
ago.213 Thus, both the general public and legal practitioners can find
value in the asymmetric standard.
Some may argue that a battle of experts could have negative
consequences. Several courts have expressed this view. In
Harrington v. Richter, although the Supreme Court recognized the
importance of expert witnesses in criminal cases, it was concerned
that the defendant’s expert “could shift attention to esoteric matters
of forensic science, distract the jury from whether [the defendant]
was telling the truth, or transform the case into a battle of the
experts.”214 However, as noted, cross-examination’s ability to
impeach expert testimony is limited. Due to a lack of expertise, most
lawyers focus on procedural matters rather than the substance of the
testimony to avoid substantial discussions involving “the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”215 As Professor
Brandon L. Garrett noted, “the Court put so much faith in its
Confrontation Clause rulings that it believes that cross-examination
can effectively ‘expose defects,’ without presenting the jury with an
expert with a contrary view of the evidence.”216 Cross-examination
by lawyers may not be an adequate substitute for contrary expert
testimony.

210. See Part II.B, III.A.
211. See supra note 92–107 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 162–72 and accompanying text.
213. See Marcia Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of AntiFormalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1, 26–30 (1980).
214. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 108-109 (2011).
215. FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
216. Garret, supra note 135, at 1160 (emphasis added).
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The Harrington Court’s reasoning is largely based on a concern
that the jury will be confused by additional testimony. As Professor
Susan Haack has noted, jurors necessarily face a “perfect
epistemological storm,” when determining the credibility and weight
of expert testimony.217 The more expert testimony presented, the
bigger the storm. However, the American legal system is
fundamentally designed around the jury’s ability to resolve conflicts,
no matter how complex they are. Many (but not all) experienced
judges respect the jury’s ability to understand and decide even
complex cases.218 Thus, before questioning the jury’s ability, it is
important to consider whether sufficient information has been given
to the jurors to make adequate judgments. As the lenient standard for
the defense is focused on when state presents forensic expert too, this
article’s proposal will prevent jurors from hearing the testimony of
prosecution experts relying on weak scientific grounds.
In some cases, extremely complex, conflicting testimony from
experts might distract or confuse the jury. This situation, however, is
where even qualified experts disagree on an issue. The real problem
is not an excess of knowledge, but a lack of (reliable) knowledge.
Recently, the fallibility of forensic evidence has become increasingly
well known. Hearing testimony from both sides would help factfinders make informed decisions. If more expert testimony is
admitted into evidence, more scrutiny is available.
If competing scientific views are repeatedly tried against each
other, then inconsistent results could occur. In similar cases, one
defendant might be convicted, whereas another could go free. In the
context of expert testimony in SBS cases, Professor Deborah
Tuerkheimer called this phenomenon “fluky justice.”219 Professor
Keith A. Findley raises a similar concern. He notes that in SBS cases,
“if doctors cannot agree on these complex and unresolved issues, it is
unlikely that jurors or judges can do any better.”220
However, these are exaggerated concerns. In the age of the
“vanishing trial,”221 trials are very rare. Only 5% of criminal cases
are tried in courts.222 Out of the cases that do go to trial, the defense
217. Susan Haack, The Expert Witness: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 28 HUMANA MENTE: J.
PHIL. STUD. 39, 42 (2015).
218. Prentice H. Mashall, A View from the Bench: Practical Perspectives on Juries, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 147, 147–48 (1990).
219. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution and the Problem of Epistemic
Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALA. L. REV. 513, 523–32 (2011).
220. Findley et al., supra note 169, at 305.
221. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. of EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
222. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
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presents its own experts less than 2% of the time.223 “Fluky justice”
is then a concern in only .1% of all criminal cases. However, if only
the prosecution is allowed to present evidence with a weak scientific
basis, the balance is shifted in favor of wrongful conviction, a much
worse tragedy than “fluky justice.”224 Perhaps, it is unreasonable to
expect unambiguous justice, when cases rely on ambiguous science.
With respect to Findley’s doubts regarding jurors and judges,
laypersons are expected to make decisions on “complex and
unresolved issues” in everyday life.225 Medical cases are an excellent
example. When one is diagnosed with a serious disease, an
acceptable response is going to another doctor (with a better
reputation) and weighing the reliability of the two diagnoses.226
Though confusing, patients carefully consider the medical
information given to them. A second diagnosis, whether the same or
different from the first one, is always meaningful. Similarly, this
article’s proposal for more expert testimony helps enhance the juror’s
understanding of the underlying issues.
V. CONCLUSION

To be sure, strictly enforcing and applying Daubert standard to
forensic evidence would be a simple and desirable solution.
However, while the unreliability of forensic evidence is becoming
increasingly well known, the courts are still reluctant to apply a strict
admissibility standard, particularly against government forensic
evidence. Even the NRC’s groundbreaking report has not changed
the courts’ practices. This article finds that without strict review from
the courts, the forensics community will not embrace genuine
scientific standards. Moreover, practically and informally, the
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011) (“[T]oday, 95 percent of criminal convictions
result from guilty pleas and only 5 percent result from trials.”).
223. Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City,
15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 764 (1986–1987). The exact number of percentage might
differ, because this study was conducted more than 30 years ago.
224. Tuerkheimer, supra note 219.
225. Findley et al., supra note 169, at 305.
226. See Kristine Crane, A Patient's Guide to Second Opinions, U.S. NEWS (Jul. 23, 2014),
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2014/07/23/a-patients-guide-to-secondopinions (“Second opinions are fairly routine. . . . ‘Any doctor who is any good at what they do will
welcome a second opinion, because it will usually be a confirming opinion.’” (quoting Trisha Torrey));
Becky Ham, Seeking a Second... or Third... Opinion, CENTER FOR ADVANCING HEARTH,
http://www.cfah.org/prepared-patient/prepared-patient-articles/seeking-a-secondor-thirdopinion
(last
visited Mar. 1, 2017) (“Seeking out multiple sources of expert advice is one of the best ways to gather
this information before proceeding with a treatment plan.”).
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prosecution enjoys a lower threshold than the defense. To resolve
these problems, this article argues an asymmetry admissibility
standard that is relaxed for defense. This asymmetric standard first
levels the playing field, because the current admissibility standard
favors the state. In addition, counter-intuitively, this new standard
would ultimately help strengthen the government’s forensic evidence,
which make this proposal more acceptable. This article also presents
legal grounds to support the asymmetrical standard and provides
specific examples of how the standard would be applied. Considering
the continued resistance before and after the 2009 NRC report, this
proposal would be a practical method to strengthen forensic
evidence.
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